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THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: WILL IT 
SUCCESSFULLY IMPROVE THE SMALL 
ISlAND ECONOMIES OF THE CARIBBEAN? 
REGINA GERRICK* 
Abstract: On June 23, 2000, after eighteen months of negotiations, the 
European Union (EU) and its Member States signed a new partnership 
agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states in 
Cotonou, Benin, called the Cotonou Agreement. This twenty-year part-
nership agreement with seventy-seven ACP states replaced the Lome 
Convention, which had provided the structure for trade and cooperation 
between the ACP states and the EU since 1975. The Cotonou Agreement 
focuses on poverty reduction as its principal objective, which will be 
achieved through political dialogue, develop-ment aid, and closer 
economic and trade cooperation. This Note discusses the structure of the 
Cotonou Agreement and analyzes the various effects the Agreement will 
have on the ACP countries, par-ticularly, the countries of the Caribbean. It 
concludes that, despite its objectives, the Agreement will likely contribute to 
a decline in the economies of the ACP nations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries began primarily because Brit-
ain, France, and Italy felt a responsibility to integrate their colonial en-
claves into the world economy.l Thus, they initiated a system of trade 
preferences to their former colonies under the Lome Conventions in 
1975.2 For the Caribbean countries, the most important set of trade 
preferences were those related to the export of agricultural products 
such as bananas and sugar.3 
* Regina Gerrick is the Managing Editor of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. She would like to thank Professor Frank Garcia for his helpful comments. 
t See Jessica L. Spiegel, Note, Will the Great Banana War Ever End: Will the Tariff Only Sys-
ternBetheSolutionr, 24 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 219,221 (2001). 
2 See id.; EuR. CENTRE FOR DEv. PoL'Y MGMT. (ECDPM), CoToNou INFOKIT: HISTORY 
AND EvoLUTION OF ACP-EU CooPERATION (3), at http:/ /www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/ 
cotonou/03_gb.htm (jan. 2001) (hereinafter HISTORY AND EVOLUTION]. 
3 See HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
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The Lome Convention was replaced, however, by the Cotonou 
Agreement for several reasons.4 Lome was complicated in structure and 
difficult to implement.5 More importantly, the United States claimed 
that preferential trade benefits to the ACP countries violated the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) clause under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) by discriminating against imports from Latin 
American banana producers.6 The World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which replaced GATT in 1994 and adopted most of its rules, authorized 
sanctions against tl1e EU to force it to comply with WTO rules. 7 These 
sanctions were in effect until the EU modified its preferential trade sys-
tem with the Cotonou Agreement.8 
The Cotonou Agreement will gradually replace the system of non-
reciprocal trade preferences with a series of new economic partner-
ships based on a progressive and reciprocal removal of trade barriers.9 
Since almost half of the population in ACP countries lives in conditions 
of absolute poverty, the Cotonou Agreement focuses on poverty reduc-
tion as its principal objective.10 With 15.2 billion euros from the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) and 10 billion euros from outstanding 
funds from previous EDFs, the EU will support the ACP governments' 
efforts to create a balanced macroeconomic context, expand the pri-
vate sector, and improve both the quality and coverage of social serv-
ices.11 
Part I of this Note explains the evolution of the ACP-EU relation-
ship and shows how the Cotonou Agreement builds on different gen-
erations of cooperation between the ACP countries and the EU. Part 
II of this Note explains the structure of the Cotonou Agreement and 
shows how the Agreement is different from the Lome Convention by 
explaining how the ACP-EU cooperation has been updated and 
4 See generally Spiegel, supra note 1, at 229. 
5 See HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
6 See Spiegel, supra note 1, at 224. 
7 See id. at 228. 
8 See id. 
9 EuR. CENTRE FOR DEV. PoL'Y MGMT. (ECDPM), CoTONOU INFOKIT: REGIONAL Eco-
NOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (14), at http:/ /www.oneworJd.org/ecdpm/en/coton-
ou/14_gb.htm (jan. 2001) [hereinafter REPAs]. 
10 Press Release, European Union Institutions, The European Community and Its Mem-
ber States Sign a New Partnership Agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
in Cotonou, Benin, at http:/ /europa.eu.int/geninfo/whatwasnew/062000.htm [hereinafter 
EU Institutions]. 
11 EuR. CENTRE FOR DEV. PoL'Y MGMT. (ECDPM), COTONOU INFOKIT: ThE CoTONOU 
AGREEMENT AT A GLANCE (2), at http:/ /www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/cotonou/02_gb. 
htm (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter CoTONOU AT A GLANCE]. 
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modified to better cope with the challenges of globalization, poverty 
reduction, and sustainable development. In particular, Part II focuses 
on the new system of economic partnerships created by the Cotonou 
Agreement. 
Part III of this Note discusses the problems faced by the Caribbean 
islands with implementing the Cotonou Agreement. For example, the 
highly profitable banana industry of the Caribbean will suffer consid-
erably from the removal of trade preferences by the Cotonou Agree-
ment. This Part also discusses how the Cotonou Agreement should bet-
ter address the problems faced by the Caribbean countries because of 
the removal of trade preferences. Finally, Part III argues that the Coto-
nou Agreement will not be effective in improving the economies of the 
Caribbean islands because 1) the transition period between the removal 
of the trade preferences to free trade is too short, and 2) the new free 
trade agreements, called Economic Partnership Agreements, which re-
quire the ACP countries to negotiate in regional groupings, will cause 
conflict between countries within the same region and dilute the negoti-
ating power of smaller countries in a region. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of the ACP-EU Cooperation 
ACP-EU cooperation dates back to the Treaty of Rome, which 
established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.12 In 
this treaty, the signatories expressed solidarity with the former over-
seas territories and committed themselves to contribute to their pros-
perity.l3 The first association of the ACP and EEC countries occurred 
through the Yaounde (1963-69) and Yaounde II (1969-75) agree-
ments.14 Most of the resources from these two agreements went to 
French-speaking Mrica to build infrastructure in the wake of de-
colonization.15 The United Kingdom's entrance into the EEC in 1973 
led to the signing of the more comprehensive Lome I Agreement be-
tween forty-six ACP countries and the nine EEC member states exist-
ing at that time (1975-80).16 




16 Id. In 1975, the nine member states of the European Community included Ger-
many, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom. HISTORY AND EvoLUTION, supra note 2. 
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The Lome I Agreement was a significant achievement for the Car-
ibbean because the United Kingdom, recognizing the importance of 
the banana and sugar industry to that region, was keen to institute spe-
cial trading preferences for those products under the EEC regimeP 
Moreover, the Caribbean and Pacific contingent of the ACP wanted to 
take advantage of the considerable bargaining power of Mrica in the 
international arena with the ratification of Lome J.l8 As a result, the 
Lome I Agreement and its subsequent revisions has played an impor-
tant role in supporting the economies of the Caribbean over the last 
twenty years. 19 
1. Features of the Lome Convention 
The Lome Convention has long been considered a highly inno-
vative model of international cooperation and has served as a plat-
form for other forms of international cooperation.2° The key original 
features of Lome included 1) aid and trade, 2) commodities, 3) pro-
tocols, 4) equal partnership, 5) mutual obligations, and 6) joint ad-
ministration.21 Through the aid and trade feature, the Lome coopera-
tion provided predictable aid flows over a five-year period as well as 
nonreciprocal trade benefits to the ACP countries.22 The commodities 
feature included the Stabilization of Export Earnings from Agricul-
tural Commodity System (STABEX) .23 STABEX was designed to help 
stabilize export receipts on a wide number of agricultural products, 
such as cocoa, coffee, and tea.24 It therefore compensated ACP coun-
tries for the shortfall in export earnings due to fluctuation in the 
prices or supply of these commodities.25 
In the protocols feature, the EEC agreed to separate trading pro-
tocols on sugar, beef, veal, bananas, and rum.26 The banana protocol, 
for instance, gave duty-free access to the EEC market for a specific 
17 See generally EUROPEAN CoMMISSION, DEVELOPMENT: THE COTONOU AGREEMENT: 
THE LoME CoNVENTION, at http:/ /europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/ 
lome_history_en.htm (last visited jan. 26, 2004). 
1B HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
19 See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGATION TO GUYANA & SURINAME, LOME 
CoNVENTION: FivE GENERATIONS OF ACP- EC AGREEMENTS, at http:/ /www.delguy.cec.eu.int. 
20 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
21 See id. 
22 !d. 
23 THE FuTURE OF EU-ACP RELATIONs, at xi (Susanna Wolfed., 1999). 
24 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
25 See generally THE FuTURE OF EU-ACP RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 21. 
26 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
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amount of bananas each year.27 Under the sugar protocol, the EEC 
bought a fixed quantity of sugar each year from ACP producers at 
guaranteed prices higher than world prices.28 This preference espe-
cially helped the economic development of certain sugar rich ACP 
states such as Guyana and Barbados.29 
The equal partnership feature gave the ACP countries the re-
sponsibility for their own development by entrusting them with a lead 
role in managing Lome resources.30 The mutual obligations feature 
incorporated the first human rights clause into an international trade 
cooperation agreement.31 The clause expressed the signatories' com-
mitment to respect and promote the enjoyment of fundamental 1m-
man rights.32 Lastly, the Lome Convention called for joint administra-
tion, which required that there be permanent dialogue about and 
joint administration of the future content of the Convention.33 
2. The Need for Change: Pressures on Lome 
The Lome trade regime was eventually undermined due to its lack 
of effectiveness and political acceptability.34 Despite the preferential 
access to EU markets, ACP export performance had deteriorated over 
the last two decades, and its diversification away from traditional prod-
ucts remained very limited primarily because of competition from Latin 
American banana exporters. 35 In addition, the Lome trade provisions 
were seen as incompatible with the new international trade rules of the 
WTQ.36 The battles around the banana regime are a case in point.37 
a. Lome and the Banana Trade Regime 
The EU's preferential trade benefits to the ACP countries limited 
the number of Latin American bananas that EU nations could im-
port.38 Multinational corporations in the United States were the pri-
27 Id. 
28 I d. 
29 Id. 
YJ Id. 
31 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, sttfrra note 2. 
32 Sec Lome Convention IV, Dec. 15, 1989, art. 5, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990), http://www. 
oneworld.org/ acpsec/ gb /lome/lome4_ e.h tm. 





38 Spiegel, supra note 1, at 219. 
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mary producers of Latin American bananas and, therefore, were es-
pecially opposed to this arrangement.39 As a result, Latin American 
banana producing countries, with U.S. support, requested that a 
wro panel examine the legality of the trade preferences.40 
Principally, the Latin American countries claimed that the EU's 
import regime was inconsistent with the MFN clause in Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the GAIT.41 According to this provision, each GAIT 
member cannot selectively discriminate against any other member 
with respect to its trade laws.42 Therefore, since both the Latin Ameri-
can countries and the ACP countries are contracting parties under 
GAIT, the MFN clause requires that the EU give equal access to its 
markets to the ACP states and the Latin American countries.43 Subse-
quendy, on Aprill9, 1999, the WfO decided that various elements of 
the EU's banana trade regime were indeed inconsistent with Article 1 
of GAIT and it informed the United States that it was entided to im-
pose retaliatory tariffs on various European products until the EU 
modified its trade preferences for ACP nations.44 
b. Histmical, Political, and Stmctural Pressures on Lome 
Another pressure the Lome Convention faced was the dwindling 
common interest between the EU and the ACP countries.45 When the 
first Lome Convention was signed, there were strong historical ties 
between Europe and the ACP, but eventually the ACP countries began 
to slide down the EU's priority list and these strong historical ties be-
gan to deteriorate.46 
Political pressures also played a role in fraying this relationship.47 
In the first three Lome Conventions, Europe adopted a neutral stance 
in the political affairs of the ACP states. 48 The democratization wave 
that swept across the developing world at the end of the Cold War, 
however, led to a growing politicization of ACP-EU cooperation.49 The 
39 See id. 
40 /d. at 223. The new banana regime adversely affects Columbia, Costa Rica, Guate-
mala, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Mexico, and El Salvador. /d. 
41 /d. at 224. 
42 /d. 
43 Spiegel, supra note 1, at 224. 
44 /d. at 228. 
45 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
46 /d. 
47 See id. 
48 /d. 
49 /d. 
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EU was confronted with the need to show European taxpayers how 
their money was being spent, especially in light of the serious economic 
and social problems faced by European nations at this time. 5° Thus, the 
EU began to initiate partial or complete suspension of preferential 
treatment where ACP countries had poor records for the respect of hu-
man rights and democratic ideals.51 Many ACP countries felt that this 
process eroded the principle of "equal partnership" and replaced it with 
conditions unrelated to the region's socio-economic development. 52 
Finally, Lome was also undermined because it was too complex.53 
This complexity resulted in long delays, bureaucratization, and reduced 
economic efficiency.54 Furthermore, these complexities hindered the 
developmental impact of Lome.55 For example, the Lome N Conven-
tion allocated approximately $2 billion to the ACP countries, but only 
$150 million actually found its way into the hands of the farmers living 
in these countries. 56 
II. DISCUSSION 
A The Cotonou Agreement: A General Overview 
1. Structure of the Agreement 
The Cotonou Agreement is structured in six parts, preceded by a 
Preamble and followed by six Annexes, three Protocols, and a Final 
Act.57 According to Article 93 of the Agreement, it will enter into 
force two months after the deposit of the following: 1) the 
ratifications of all EU Member States, 2) the ratifications of at least 
two-thirds of the ACP states, and 3) the instrument of approval by the 
Community. 58 The Agreement, effective on March 1, 2000, will cover a 
twenty-year period in accordance with Article 95, with financial provi-





55 HISTORY AND EVOLUTION, supra note 2. 
56 Spiegel, supra note 1, at 229. 
57 See Cotonou Agreement, June 
http:/ /www.acpsec.org/gb/ cotonou/accordl.htm. 
58 !d. art. 93. 
23, 2000, ACP-Eur., 
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sions of five years. 59 Furthermore, Article 95 allows for the possibility 
of reviewing the other provisions of the Agreement every five years.60 
2. Objectives, Principles, and Elements of the Agreement 
The objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, stated in Article 1, are 
to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, promote sustainable devel-
opment, and gradually integrate the ACP countries into the world 
economy.61 The fundamental principles, stated in Article 2, include: 1) 
the equality of the partners, 2) definition by the ACP countries of their 
development strategies, and 3) participation of non-state actors.62 The 
Cotonou Agreement takes some of the Lome Convention's essential 
elements, including the mutual obligations feature of Lome, which 
called for the respect for human rights and democratic principles.63 A 
violation of these elements under Cotonou by the ACP states could 
trigger a consultation mechanism possibly leading to a suspension of 
the cooperation.64 
B. Lome vs. Cotonou: A Comparison 
1. The Trade Cooperation (Articles 36-54) 
The first and probably most radical change in this new Cotonou 
Agreement is the eventual phasing-out of the ACP's nonreciprocal 
trade preferences.65 The trade preferences system will eventually be 
replaced by a set of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that 
will tie nondiscriminatory trade policies with developmental aid.66 As 
a result, the EPAs are in essence Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), with 
regional groupings of ACP countries where each party undertakes to 
abolish restrictions on imports from the other party.67 One key differ-
ence between EPAs and FTAs, however, is that the ACPs will receive 
funding from the EDF and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to 
59 Id. art. 95. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. art. 1. 
62 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 57, art. 2. 
63 Id. art. 9(2). 
64 !d. art. 9(3). 
65 See EUR. CENTRE FOR DEV. PoL'Y MGMT, (ECDPM), COTONOU INFOKIT: INNOVA-
TIONS IN THE COTONOU AGREEMENT (4), at http:/ /www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/coto-
nou/04_gb.htm (jan. 2001) [hereinafter INNOVATIONs]. 
66 !d. 
67 REP As, supra note 9. 
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facilitate their implementation of the EPAs.68 Negotiations for the 
EPAs started in September 2002, and these new agreements should be 
completed by 2008 with periodical reviews in 2004 and 2006.69 
Moreover, there is a transitional period for implementation of the 
EPAs, which can last up to twelve years.7o 
The primary objectives of the EPAs are: 1) to increase access for 
European companies to the ACP markets, and 2) to strengthen inte-
gration between the ACP and the EU.71 According to the EU, freer 
trade between the EU and the ACP will strengthen ACP producers 
because they will experience increased competition with EU goods in 
ACP markets due to the reciprocity element of the EPAs.72 
The EU also requires the ACP countries to negotiate these EPA's 
collectively in regional groupings.73 To negotiate an EPA as a region 
will involve prior negotiation between Member States to decide on a 
common set of policies.74 Also, the countries will have to agree on 
which country within the region will be given the power to negotiate 
with the EU.75 If the countries are unable to negotiate as a region, 
they will be deprived of potential EPA benefits such as aid.76 
2. Aid Entitlements (Article 3, Annex IV) 
The second difference between Lome and Cotonou relates to the 
role of performance in aid management.77 Under Lome, aid was 
granted to the ACP states regardless of their political and economic 
performance.78 However, as of 2008, the Cotonou Agreement marks 
the end of the "aid entitlements," that is, fixed allocations regardless of 
a country's political and economic performance.79 The EU will now 
give aid on the basis of two criteria: 1) level of development, and 2) re-
68 ld. 
69 STEPHEN j.H. DEARDEN & CLARA MIRA SALAMA, THE COTONOU AGREEMENT, (Man-
chester Metropolitan Univ., Dep't ofEcon., Eur. Dev. Pol'y Study Group, Discussion Paper 
No. 20, 2001), at http:/ /www.edpsg.org/Documents/Dp20.doc. 
70 ld. 
71 REP As, supra note 9. 
72 See id. 
73 ld. 
74 EuR. CENTRE FOR DEV. PoL'v MGMT. (ECDPM), CoTONou INFOKIT: ACP-EU TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CoTONOU (15), at http:/ /www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/cotonou/ 
15_gb.htm (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter ACP-EU TRADE NEGOTIATIONS]. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
77 INNOVATIONS, supra note 65. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. 
140 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:131 
gional integration projects.80 This implies that the EU can use the re-
sources for the ACP in a more selective and flexible way.81 In practice, it 
means that more money can be channeled to "good performers" and 
that the share for "bad performers" can be reduced.82 The program-
ming of aid resources, therefore, is a strategic management tool, aimed 
at ensuring that EU support is not wasted on a given country or re-
gion.83 
3. Stronger Political Dialogue (Article 8) 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement introduces the third major 
contrast with the Lome Convention: a stronger political dialogue for 
the ACP-EU partnership.84 Through this dialogue, the parties will ex-
change information and discuss the objectives of the Agreement and 
any other matter of mutual or general concern.85 Discussion will cover 
a broad range of political issues that fall outside traditional develop-
ment cooperation.86 These issues include peace and security, the arms 
trade, migration, drugs and organized crimes, and religious or racial 
discrimination. 87 
4. Extending the Partnership to New Actors (Article 4) 
The fourth major new feature relates to the participation of non-
state actors and local authorities.88 Unlike Lome, which focused on 
the participation of central governments, this new feature encourages 
local and regional authorities, civil society, and the private sector to 
participate as well.89 Among the new actors, the most attention is 
given to the private sector.90 Its role "as the engine for development" 
is explicitly recognized.91 In fact, the private sector will have access to 
funding via the EIB without requiring a state guarantee.92 Also, a new 
investment facility, created by Cotonou, aims to stimulate regional 
80 REP As, supra note 9. 
81 See INNOVATIONS, supra note 65. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 





91 INNOVATIONS, supra note 65. 
92 Id. 
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and international investment while strengthening the capacity of local 
financial institutions.93 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Problems with the Cotonou Agreement 
1. The Effects of the Agreement on the Small Island Economies of 
the Caribbean 
a. Lome and Bananas 
The Lome Convention conceded certain trade preferences to the 
fifteen ACP members located in the Caribbean, many of which are 
small island nations that rely on banana production for their eco-
nomic growth.94 Lome essentially guaranteed these countries a certain 
percentage ofthe EU banana market.95 
Certain ACP members especially benefited from this feature of 
Lome. The Windward Islands (Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. 
Vincent), former colonies of the United Kingdom, represent four 
small Caribbean nations that survive, in large part, by exporting ba-
nanas to the EU under the auspices of the Lome Convention.96 In 
fact, some have argued that bananas are the "only legitimate year-
round crop that can viably be cultivated in the Caribbean to provide a 
regular weekly income to small farmers" because over one-third of the 
population in the Windward Islands depends on the banana industry 
for support.97 For example, thirty-three percent of Dominica's labor 
force and seventy percent of St. Vincent's population are directly or 
indirectly involved in the production and marketing ofbananas.98 
93 See id. 
94 Hale Sheppard, Note, The Lomi Convention in the Next Millennium: Modification of the 
Trade/Aid Package for Regional Integration, 7 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 84, 85 (1998). The Carib-
bean Islands that are part of the Cotonou Agreement include Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, jamaica, St. Vin-
cent & the Grenadines, St. Kitts-NeYis, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and Haiti. EuR. CEN-
TRE FOR DEV. PoL'Y MGMT. (ECDPM), CoTONOU INFOKIT: SOME BASIC FACTS (5), at 
http:/ /www.oneworld.org/ ecdpm/ en/ cotonou/05__gb.htm (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter SoME 
BASIC FACTS]. 
95 See Sheppard, supra note 94, at 86. 
96 Id. at 85. 
97 Id.; CLAIRE GoDFREY, OxFAM GB, A FUTURE FOR CARIBBEAN BANANAs: THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF EUROPE's BANANA MARKET TO THE CARIBBEAN, at http:/ /www.oxfam.org.uk/ 
what_we_do/issues/trade/wto_bananas.htm (Mar. 1998). 
98 !d. 
142 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:131 
b. Cotonou aud Bananas 
Specific negative ramifications for the region in the event of the 
eradication of the Lome banana trade preferences could include: 1) 
unemployment, generating social and political unrest, 2) a rise in drug 
trade, 3) increased illicit emigration to the United States, and 4) an in-
ability to service foreign debts.99 For example, the World Bank claims 
that any adverse change in the trading environment would have a "ma-
jor impact" on Dominica, an island in which thirty percent of the total 
population already lives below the poverty line.100 Similarly, in refer-
ence to the island of St. Vincent, the World Bank has predicted that a 
change in the banana industry would cause unemployment, reduced 
foreign investment, and other major "devastating effects. "101 
Removing the trade preferences may condemn thousands of 
people to poverty and hardship because many farmers rely on the 
weekly income from bananas to pay their household costs. 102 This 
change will therefore contradict the goals of the Cotonou Agreement, 
since it seeks to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty.1°3 Moreover, 
higher levels of unemployment will increase the crime rates in these 
Caribbean countries because people will probably resort to crime to 
support themselves. 104 As a result, the significant achievements of 
these islands' governments in pursuing democracy will be severely 
threatened as they will struggle to cope with rising economic depriva-
tion and social unrest.1°5 
There is also a very real danger that the banana farmers will re-
sort to the production of illegal drugs as a viable economic alterna-
tive.106 For example, a few dozen marijuana plants on a small plot of 
land will be sold for up to thirty times more per kilo than a farmer's 
banana crop.107 Furthermore, it is claimed that St. Vincent can now 
count marijuana as its principal export crop, and there is an increase 
in the production of the crop in Grenada and Dominica.1os 
99 Sheppard, supra note 94, at 94. 
100 ld. at 85 
101 ld. 
10~ GODFREY, supra note 97. 
1°3 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 57, art. 1. 
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The Cotonou Agreement will also severely affect the Caribbean's 
heavy reliance on foreign trade in paying public debt,l09 When the 
banana preferences are removed, these small island economies will 
have great difficulty in repaying public debts because of the lack of 
foreign exchange earnings from the banana trade.110 This inability to 
repay public debts will also cause foreign investors to hesitate before 
investing in these debt-ridden economies.111 
2 The Effects of the EPAs on the Caribbean 
The ACP states see the EPAs as problematic.112 For instance, 
whereas countries not wishing to sign an EPA will lose the benefit of 
their present preferences, they would presumably benefit from the 
EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) .m However, there is 
very limited benefit to being a part of the GSP for the Caribbean na-
tions because the GSP covers fewer products than Lome and excludes 
agricultural products.ll4 
Moreover, the GSP tariff and nontariff reductions and exemp-
tions are less generous than those provided by Lome; likewise, the 
preferences are not negotiated, but are unilaterally offered by the EU, 
implying that they can be unilaterally revoked. 115 Thus, if a Caribbean 
country decides not to sign an EPA, it will not only lose its preferences 
for bananas, but it will also risk losing whatever few preferences that 
are granted by the GSP.ll6 As a result, it seems that countries have no 
real choice but to join the EPAs or suffer the consequences.117 
The ACP states also see the EPAs as a complication to regional 
integration because countries are being asked to negotiate EPAs to-
gether as one region; however, some countries that belong to this re-
gional grouping are being treated differently.118 For instance, accord-
ing to Article 37(9) of the Agreement, the thirty-nine Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) of the ACP, most of which are not Car-
109 Hon. Ignatius Jean, Ensuring a Fair and Equitable Trading Syste111: The Vulnerability of 
S111all Countries, 5-6, (22nd Conference of Members from Small Countries, 2001), at 
http:/ /www.cpahq.org. 
liO See id. 
m See id. 
ll2 See REP As, supra note 9. 
m SeeACP-EU TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 74. 
ll4 REP As, supra note 9. 
liS Jd. 
liS See generally id. 
ll7 See generally id. 
liB Jd. 
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ibbean countries, are not obliged to sign an EPA in order to retain 
their present level of access to the EU .119 In view of the special fragility 
of their economies, these countries can choose to keep the existing 
nonreciprocal trade preferences and are assured that they will con-
tinue to have free access to the EU market for essentially all products 
until 2005 at the latest.l2° 
The non-LDC APC states see this policy as the EU playing coun-
tries within the same region against each other, hence, destroying the 
harmonious intra-ACP collaboration that presently exists. 121 Moreo-
ver, smaller Caribbean countries argue that this framework will lessen 
their bargaining power in comparison to the bigger countries within 
their region because bigger countries will use their power to pursue 
their own interests, causing the opinions of the island nations to be 
either lost or forgotten.I22 
Finally, several preconditions exist to enable the negotiation and 
the establishment of EPAs.I23 For example, to sign an EPA with the 
EU, a regional grouping must be an effective free trade zone or a cus-
toms union; however, very few ACP regions have reached this stage.124 
Furthermore, the trade negotiation abilities of ACP countries are very 
weak and those of the regions as a whole are almost nonexistent. 125 
Also, the EU's negotiation capacity is insufficient to conduct several 
negotiations simultaneously with the ACP, especially considering its 
other bilateral and multilateral negotiations.I26 
B. Potential Cotonou Reforms 
The Cotonou Agreement should be reformed in two ways. First, it 
must give the ACP states more time to adjust to the changes from 
Lome, especially with respect to the removal of trade preferences.I27 
Also, since the Caribbean countries will eventually have to compete 
with the bananas produced by U.S. owned multinational corporations 
in Latin America, the Cotonou Agreement should focus on ways in 
119 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 57, art. 37(9). The thirty-nine least developed ACP 
countries are most of the African countries, a few Pacific countries, and one Caribbean 
country, Haiti. See SoME BASIC FAcTs, supm note 94. 
12o Dearden & Salama, supra note 69. 
121 See REP As, supra note 9. 
122 Sheppard, supra note 94, at 97. 
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which the banana producers in the Caribbean could improve the 
competitiveness of their banana market, instead of focusing on ways 
in which the Caribbean could diversify its exports.12s 
Though it can be argued that the ACP should have realized that 
the removal of the trade preferences was inevitable, it was also very 
sudden.129 Even though the Cotonou Agreement will not remove the 
trade preferences for five more years, and although there is a possible 
twelve-year transitional period, it seems impossible that the countries 
that have relied on these preferences for the past three decades can 
simply diversify into other industries besides bananas.I30 The other al-
ternatives, which could provide comparable employment or income, 
are nonexistent for various reasons. 131 First, any alternative crop would 
confront the disadvantages of terrain, climate, and size of planta-
tions.132 Second, in order to be profitable, any alternative product 
would require access to major markets, the majority of which are al-
ready "entrenched in competition. "133 Third, other products will incur 
higher per unit shipping costs because they will not be able to take ad-
vantage of the large shipping discounts that the banana industry enjoys 
with its high export volumes.I34 
Competition with Latin American banana corporations, such as 
Dole, Chiquita, and Del Monte, also appears inevitable to the banana 
producers in the Caribbean; therefore, their hope is to improve the 
quality and productivity of their banana production.135 Few banana 
producers, however, have the resources to do so.136 Currently, the ad-
ministration of EU funding initiatives to these producers is cumber-
some and inflexible, which means that funds are often not deployed 
and do not reach intended beneficiaries. 137 Although the Cotonou 
Agreement includes reform mechanisms that hope to dramatically 
improve the efficiency of EU aid, appropriate knowledge and capacity 
may not be readily available in these relatively new policy areas. 138 
128 See generally GoDFREY, supra note 97; Sheppard, supra note 94, at 98. 
129 See generally Cotonou Agreement, supra note 57. 
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The Caribbean islands have complied with every aspect of this 
long-standing regime of trade preferences set up by Lome. They are 
staunch allies of the United States and politically stable, with literacy 
rates in the ninetieth percentile, and little or no human rights 
abuses.139 Yet, the trade preferences were called into question and 
deemed as illegal because U.S. companies in Latin America objected 
to them. By complying with WTO rules, the EU will have to open its 
market to U.S. owned companies such as Chiquita, Dole, and Del 
Monte, and it is hard to imagine that the Caribbean countries will be 
able to compete with these multinational corporations that already 
dominate the world market.14° 
Admittedly, in an age of global market liberalization, economic 
dependency on one commodity is a serious problem for small island 
economies. Thus, it is understandable that the EU is pushing the Car-
ibbean Islands towards diversification of their markets. However, the 
transition period between the Lome system to the new system under 
Cotonou is too short. While it is acknowledged that "it is better to 
teach a man how to fish that to give him the fish ... he must be given 
a fish while he is being taught to fish."l 41 In other words, the EU must 
continue to give the Caribbean countries trade preferences while they 
are taking the time to develop successful alternatives to bananas. 
Twelve years is not enough time for these countries to move from an 
economic system that fostered dependence to a new system that ar-
gues for interdependence. 
139 Sheppard, supra note 94, at 98. 
140 !d. at 95. 
141 Michael B. Joseph, Post Lome N Arrangements Must Mirror the Principles and Instru-
ments of Lome: A Perspective fivm the Banana Sectors of the Windward Islands (ECDPM Working 
Paper No. 18, Apr. 1997), at http:/ /www.ecdpm.org/pubs/wp18_gb.htm. 
